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Abstract 
Whether couples pool their resources and behave like a unit or spend their income 
individually is crucial for social and tax policy. In this paper, I provide a test of the income 
pooling hypothesis using administrative cross-sectional survey data on expenditures and 
individual incomes of couple households in Germany. The test is performed within the 
Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System (QUAIDS) framework, which allows for an 
endogenous expenditure budget and endogenous individual income contribution shares in an 
instrumental variables approach. Although the hypothesis is broadly rejected, there are 
significant differences regarding the marital status, the presence of at least one child in the 
household and whether the household is located in a former West or East German federal 
state. Married couples and couples with children are closer to the acceptance of the 
hypothesis than unmarried couples without children.  
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Income pooling within a couple household does not only have important implications for the 
consumer behavior and the intra-household labor supply allocation, but it also determines 
the needs and the equivalence scale of the household. These issues may have consequences 
for the design of social benefits and for poverty politics. But the presence or absence of income 
pooling is also relevant for income taxation. In Germany, married couples are treated as a 
single tax unit with joint assessment and the offsetting of income differences between 
spouses. This treatment implies perfect income pooling of the spouses and grants, in a 
progressive tax system, a lower average tax rate for the couple than individual tax 
assessment (in the presence of income differences between the spouses). In consequence, 
marginal tax rates are also shared within the couple, which would be optimal in case of 
income pooling and suboptimal related to an individual leisure-consumption decision. 
 
The paper contributes new evidence on testing the income pooling hypothesis for Germany 
with survey data on household expenditures. Income pooling in the theoretical economic 
framework means that the household faces a single utility function which is maximized by its 
members. This so-called “unitary” model (Becker, 1991) implies that total household budget 
is the relevant determinant for the individual consumption in the household while the 
individual contribution shares to the household income do not matter. On this basis, I provide 
a test of the hypothesis within the framework of a Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System 
(QUAIDS) (see Banks, Blundell and Lewbel, 1997) whether the demand on women’s clothing 
depends on women’s income share of total household income. Endogeneity issues of the 
household budget and women’s income contribution share are handled in an instrumental 
variables setting. Additionally, heterogeneity in the effects regarding marital status and the 
presence of children in the household, as well as between former East and West German 
federal states is also considered. 
 
There is a vast empirical literature on testing the income pooling hypothesis with different 
approaches. Personally allocable consumption expenditures are rarely available in common 
household surveys, since expenditures are typically observed only on the household level 
except for clothing and footwear expenditures. These categories are often separately 
available for women, men and children in the data and can therefore be attributed to persons. 
Although clothing and footwear are only proxies for total individual consumption, a recent 
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study, which exploits a data set of households from Bangladesh with detailed expenditures on 
the individual level, suggests that spending on clothing is the best predictor among all goods 
to identify the resource sharing rule within the household (see Bargain, Lacroix and Tiberti, 
2018).  
 
There is a class of papers that uses structural household consumption models to test the 
hypothesis with micro data. Browning et al. (1994) reject the unitary household model with 
Canadian survey data in a structural framework and identify a household sharing rule of 
resources. They find that personal expenditures is significantly affected by the share of 
income a spouse contributes to total household income. Browning and Chiappori (1998) test a 
series of theoretical assumptions within a structural demand system and find evidence for a 
collective household model for couples instead of the unitary one. Phipps and Burton (1998) 
test the pooling hypothesis in a demand system also with Canadian data and find mixed 
results for different expenditure data. Income pooling cannot be rejected e.g. for housing but 
on the other side, wives are more likely to spend their income on child care than husbands.     
 
The study of Lundberg et al. (1997) belongs to a class of papers that uses a policy change as 
natural experiment. A child allowance was transferred to wives in the UK starting in 1977. 
The authors find strong evidence of a shift toward greater expenditures on women’s and 
children’s clothing due to the reform which is not in line with the pooling hypothesis. A more 
recent reform of child and working tax credits in 2003 in the UK was used by Fisher (2016) to 
analyze the effects on spending patterns. He finds significant positive effects on expenditures 
related to children. Ward-Batts (2008) combines a structural model with the exogenous 
variation of the UK reform in 1977 and confirms the findings of Lundberg et al. (1997).      
 
Another line in the literature uses survey questions that are directly related to pooling in the 
household. Bonke and Uldall-Poulsen (2007) exploit Danish survey data and find that most 
couples fully or partly pool their income. They also show that the probability of income 
pooling depends on several household characteristics as e.g. the duration of marriage and the 
existence of children in the household. Bonke and Browning (2009) use the same data and 
report that two-thirds of couple households answers that they pool their resources. However, 
a small part of them indicates inconsistency if other answers are taken into account. 
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Finally, intra-household allocation of resources is also examined in experimental settings. 
Attanasio and Lechene (2002) use a welfare program designed as a field experiment in 
Mexico, which transferred money to mothers, to look at the outcomes of the correspondents. 
They find that women gained more influence in the decision-making process of the household 
due to the shift of resources. Beblo and Beninger (2017) use experimental data on 95 German 
couples and conclude that the hypothesis is rejected for more than a half of the couples, also 
noting that couples with higher household income and higher education are more likely to 
pool their resources.      
 
Despite the highly relevant political debate in Germany, the evidence on income pooling of 
couples is small for the country and especially lacking of a structural approach. The paper at 
hand adds evidence from structural demand system estimation applied to pooled data of the 
income and consumption survey for Germany (Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe, 
EVS) for the years 2008 and 2013. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: The methodological approach is provided in Section 2. Data 
and descriptives are presented in Section 3, followed by the empirical results in Section 4. 
Section 5 concludes.  
 
 
2. Model and Empirical Strategy 
Income pooling within a household means that the individual consumption of each member 
does not depend on the individual income contributions to the household budget. Therefore, a 
shift in the income contribution share should not alter individual consumption – given that 
the household budget stays constant. This is the case, for example, if one partner reduces 
working time for child care, which reduces his or her income, while the other partner 
increases working time to compensate the income reduction. Individual consumption 
measured as expenditures for goods and services solely consumed by one partner should not 
be affected by this shift in income contribution (given that preferences for the goods do not 
change). This general test is embedded in a structural household demand system, controlling 
for the total consumption budget, prices and taste shifters. Additionally, the model is 




2.1. The model 
 
The structural framework for the test of the income pooling hypothesis is the Quadratic 
Almost Ideal Demand System (QUAIDS) (see Banks et al., 1997). The QUAIDS is often used 
in the literature to model consumer demand with household data and is based on 
price-independent generalized logarithmic (PIGLOG) preferences with Engel curves that are 
modeled as budget shares being a quadratic function of the log-budget.1 It has the advantage 
of a flexible underlying utility function and allows imposing the restrictions of a consistent 
demand system like homogeneity and symmetry. For each 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁  goods and the 
corresponding budget shares 𝑤𝑖 , the QUAIDS forms the following non-linear system of 
equations: 
  













+ 𝑢𝑖                                                                      (1) 
for 𝑖 = 1, . . , 𝑁 goods and 𝑗 = 1, . . , 𝑁 with consumption budget 𝑚, prices 𝑝𝑖 and price indices 
 
𝑎(𝑝) = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑙𝑛 𝑝𝑖 +
1
2
∑ ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑗 𝑙𝑛 𝑝𝑖 𝑙𝑛 𝑝𝑗 
 
𝑏(𝑝) =  ∏ 𝑝𝑖
𝛽𝑖  
 
The model allows computing budget and (un)compensated price elasticities, as well as 
cross-price elasticities between different good prices. Although the system is non-linear due 
to its price indices, it can be estimated easily using the method of the Iterated Linear Least 
Squares Estimator (ILLE) which imposes conditional linearity on the parameters (Blundell 
and Robin, 1999).2 Further explanatory variables that account as taste shifters for household 





                                                 
1 Ward-Batts (2008) also uses the QUAIDS to test the income pooling hypothesis.  
2 The Stata routine „aidsills“ by Lecocq and Robin (2015), which implements the Blundell and Robin 





The test of the income pooling hypothesis is performed with administrative household 
microdata containing consumption expenditures (see Section 3). The budget shares 𝑤𝑖 in the 
QUAIDS model are calculated by dividing the expenditures of consumption good 𝑖 by the 
total consumption budget within each household. Expenditures are in general observed on 
household level in the data and therefore not assignable to the individuals in a couple 
household. The only expenditure categories which allow the assignment to individuals in the 
household are those for clothing and footwear. These categories are observed for adults by 
gender (explicitly for persons aged 14 or older) and additionally for children. Although 
clothing and footwear categories are only proxies for total private consumption, a recent 
study, which exploits a data set of households from Bangladesh with detailed expenditures on 
the individual level, suggests that spending on clothing is the best predictor among all goods 
to identify a resource sharing rule within the household (see Bargain, Lacroix and Tiberti, 
2018). 
 
For the unambiguous assignment of the spending, the approach focuses on mixed-gender 
couple households with no further adults and uses the personal expenditures on clothing and 
footwear to test the hypothesis. To avoid a wrong assignment of clothing and footwear 
expenditures for older children in the household to the categories for adults, the sample is 
restricted to households with children aged below 14 (or without children). Using these 
categories as proxies for individual consumption is a limitation but a general approach in the 
literature as other personally assignable expenditures are typically not observed in classic 
consumption surveys (see e.g. Lundberg et al., 1997; Phipps and Burton, 1998; Ward-Batts, 
2008).    
 
Although the demand system can be modeled as detailed as the expenditure categories in the 
data allow, the underlying utility function with weakly separable preferences makes it 
possible to aggregate the single goods to commodity groups. This attribute is useful to keep 
the estimation feasible by reducing the number of price effects in the model because of the 
general problem with small variation in prices, which occurs in demand system estimation on 
pooled cross-sectional data. I use quarterly data from two survey years, 2008 and 2013, which 
leaves the price variation to eight points in time. The aggregation of single expenditure 
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categories to commodity groups features the attribute of computing Stone-Lewbel prices for 
the groups to increase the variation in prices (Lewbel, 1989). With the assumption of constant 
expenditure shares within a commodity group (implying Cobb-Douglas preferences in the 
group), the prices of the single goods are weighted with their expenditure shares in the 
commodity group. Since these shares vary for every household, price variation increases with 
the use of Stone-Lewbel prices. However, the small variation over time remains a challenge 
for the estimation, especially if the commodity groups consist of only a few goods.       
 
As the focus is on testing the income pooling hypothesis, there is no major objection to restrict 
the demand system to three commodity groups, which results in a three equations system: 
Women’s clothing and footwear, men’s clothing and footwear and a composite good that 
aggregates all other non-durable consumption. The budget 𝑚  therefore contains the 
spending on non-durable consumption including the expenditures on clothing and footwear of 
both partners. The share of gross income contributed by the woman to the household gross 
income is introduced as 𝑠. Accordingly, the share of income contributed by the man to the 
household income is 1 − 𝑠. Income can thereby stem from different income sources, not only 
labor but also transfers, pension income, business income and so on. If income is pooled and 
individual consumption only depends on the household budget, commodity prices and taste 
shifters but not on the individual income contribution, then the parameter on 𝑠 should not 
be significantly different from zero. The variable can be added to the system of equations (1) 
in the same way as taste shifters and other control variables 𝑥𝑘 by entering equation (1) in: 
 
𝛼𝑖 =  𝛼𝑖,0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖,𝑘𝑥𝑘
𝑘
+ 𝛼𝑖,𝐾+1𝑠                                                                                                                           (2) 
 
The hypothesis is obviously rejected if 𝛼𝑤𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛,𝐾+1 ≠ 0 in the equation for women’s clothing 
and footwear. But as the adding-up restriction of demand systems is imposed in the 
estimation (𝛼𝑤𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛 + 𝛼𝑚𝑒𝑛 + 𝛼𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒 = 0), this would in principle allow 𝛼𝑤𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛,𝐾+1 = 0, 
while 𝛼𝑚𝑒𝑛,𝐾+1 in the equation for men’s clothing and footwear and 𝛼𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒,𝐾+1 in the 
composite good equation are different from zero. But this result would imply that household 
consumption patterns depend on the income contribution share of women, which would also 




The demographic control variables consist of dummies for the number of children in the 
household, quartic polynomials of age of both partners, a dummy for marriage, dummies for 
agglomeration level of the place of residence, time dummies (quarter, year), dummies for the 
federal state and a dummy for owner-occupied housing. 
 
2.3. Endogeneity  
 
There are some potential sources of endogeneity in the model, which are addressed in an 
instrumental variables (IV) approach. A classic endogeneity issue in demand systems is 
related to the budget 𝑚, which stands in the denominator of the expenditure share on the 
left-hand side of the equations and also depends on the consumption preferences. The 
common solution for this issue can be implemented by using the disposable household income 
and its quadratic term as instruments in a Two-Stage Least Square (2SLS) type of estimator 
for a system of equations (see e.g. Blundell and Robin, 1999). The basic idea follows the 
augmented regression framework. In the first stage, budget 𝑚 is regressed on the exogenous 
control variables 𝑥𝑘 and the instruments. Then, the residuals of this regression are added to 
every equation in the system via (2) as additional control variables. Blundell and Robin 
(1999) show that under the assumption that the error term 𝑢𝑖 of (1) can be orthogonally 
decomposed into the residuals from stage one and a white noise term, the augmented 
regression estimator is identical to the 2SLS estimator. Since the assumption of exogenous 
labor supply has to be somehow relaxed in the approach at hand, the disposable income is not 
an appropriate instrument. Instead, the gross wages of both partners are assumed to be 
exogenous and taken as instruments. The specific modeling will be discussed later. 
 
All commodity prices are assumed to be exogenous. The small but existent time variation of 
the consumer prices used in the model stem from the years 2008 and 2013. There was a 
reform of the standard rate of value-added tax in Germany in 2009, which affected many 
commodities including the expenditures on clothing and footwear. The rate was increased by 
three percentage points from 16 to 19 percent, which can be seen as an exogenous variation in 
prices given an elastic supply curve. 
 
Another potential endogenous regressor can be seen in the women’s share of income 
contribution 𝑠, as the preferences for clothing and footwear and therefore the household 
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consumption pattern as a whole could affect the labor supply decision of the couple. For 
example, if women with strong preferences for clothing and footwear work more compared to 
their partners than women with lower preferences for these goods, the coefficient on the 
share of income contribution would be upwards biased and reject the hypothesis although the 
household members pool their income. Thus, women’s income contribution is endogenous to 
the labor supply allocation of both partners, which in turn can be endogenous to consumer 
preferences.3 Another potential endogeneity issue stems from the matching of the couples. 
The preferences for clothing and footwear of partner A may influence the match with partner 
B, for example, because of partner B’s income. This could also distort the test on income 
pooling as the considered couples may systematically vary in their unobserved characteristics 
(see Lundberg et al., 1997).  
 
The standard approach in household demand analysis assumes separability between 
consumer demand and labor supply (e.g. Banks et al., 1997). This is also a useful assumption 
in the type of literature, which examines the identification of the sharing rule – the shares of 
resources that are jointly or privately consumed in the household (e.g. Browning, Chiaporri 
and Lewbel, 2013). Separability can be theoretically modeled as a two-stage budgeting 
process (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980). At the first stage, the household labor supply 
decision is made, which determines leisure, non-durable and durable consumption of the 
household members (and savings, which are future consumption). At the second stage, 
non-durable consumption is allocated on goods and services. The separability assumption 
allows focusing on non-durable consumption and to treat the labor supply decision of the first 
stage as exogenous and independent. This assumption does not have to be relaxed in the 
analysis at hand to test the hypothesis. Total labor supply of the couple remains separable 
from consumption but the separability from the distribution of labor supply within the couple 
is relaxed. Therefore, it is needful to tackle the endogeneity issues linked to the share of gross 




                                                 
3 A collective household labor supply model that also incorporates consumer demand is examined 
theoretically for example in Blundell, Chiaporri and Meghir (2005) and in Cherchye, De Rock and 
Vermeulen (2012), who extend the former and apply it empirically. Applications within the QUAIDS 
framework that focus on environmentally relevant consumer goods can be found in West and Williams 
(2004) and Beznoska (2014). 
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At the first stage, I estimate the two equations: 
 
𝑠            =  Φ11𝑋1 + Θ
11𝑍1 + 𝜐1                                                                                                                               (3)       
ln(𝑚)    =  Φ21𝑋1 + Φ
22𝑋2 + Θ
21𝑍1 + Θ
22𝑍2 + 𝜐2      
 
where 𝑋1  and 𝑋2  are vector-subsets of the exogenous variables, which also enters the 
demand system at the second stage in (2) . The vectors 𝑍1  and 𝑍2  are subsets of the 
instrumental variables (excluded in the demand system). Φ and Θ are parameter vectors. 
 
In the first equation, women’s contribution share 𝑠  depends on the subset of control 
variables 𝑋1 and the instruments 𝑍1. The instruments in 𝑍1 are dummies for the type of 
school graduation of the man and the woman, interaction terms between them, as well as 
dummies for the type of highest educational/vocational graduation of both partners and again 
their interactions. The idea here is that education is separable from the preferences for 
non-durable consumption and can be left out in the demand system. However, it influences 
the share of income contribution ex-ante by bargaining position of the partners in the 
household labor supply decision and is also assumed to be correlated with the match of 
couples apart from preferences for consumption. The vector-subset 𝑋1 contains all exogenous 
variables of the demand system except for the marriage dummy, the dummies for the number 
of children and the dummy for owner-occupied housing. These variables are denoted as vector 
𝑋2 and only appear in the second equation. The reason is that they are assumed to be 
potentially endogenous to the share of income contribution e.g. via the tax benefits of joint 
assessment of married couples in Germany if the share is far away from 0.5, which is also 
part of the research question and will be further examined in the heterogeneity analysis. 
Therefore, vector 𝑋2 only appears in the budget equation at the first stage as the variables 
are in principle important for attributes that influence the household income and ultimately 
the consumption budget.    
 
The instruments in 𝑍2 are man’s and woman’s gross wages in logs, which are derived from 
the data on individual gross income and working time. The exogeneity assumption relies on 
exogenously determined gross hourly wages that are independent of the reported working 
time. Since firstly, many wages are negotiated by trade-unions in Germany and secondly, for 
those not working, a classic Heckman model (Heckman, 1979) is estimated separately for 
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men and women to impute the wages, this assumption is not seen as crucial to instrument 
the budget. 4  The wages are left out of the first equation because women’s income 
contribution share and the wages are all derived from the information on individual gross 
income, which creates a dependency by construction.  
  
The two equations are overidentified as there are much more instruments than endogenous 
variables and can be estimated by seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) to have efficiently 
estimated standard errors for the F-tests of the instruments. The first stage can then be 
linked to the second stage, which is the demand system, in an augmented regression 
framework like the one used in Blundell and Robin (1999). Thus, the predicted residuals from 
(3), ?̂?1 and ?̂?2, are included in (2) to account for the endogeneity of 𝑠 and 𝑚. Tests on the 
exogeneity of 𝑠 and 𝑚 can be derived from the estimated coefficients on ?̂?1 and ?̂?2 in the 
demand system. This test on exogeneity is combined with a test for overidentifying 
restrictions and Shea’s partial R2 to further check for the validity of the instruments.     
 
 
3. Data and Descriptives 
The model is estimated with two pooled cross-sections of data from the income and 
consumption survey for Germany (Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe, EVS) for the 
years 2008 and 2013. This administrative data set is a representative sample of households 
in Germany containing detailed information on income and expenditures. Each survey year 
features about over 40,000 households. The households are observed for one quarter equally 
distributed over all four quarters and with quarterly income and expenditure information. 
While consumption expenditures are only reported at the household level, income 
information is available individually for every household member. Very rich households are 
not included in the data as it prevents households with a quarterly household net income of 
more than 18,000 euro per quarter to enter the sample. However, this should not have a great 
impact on the average marginal effects regarding a consumption analysis. 
 
As already described in Section 2.2., I focus on the demand analysis of non-durable 
consumption and explicitly the expenditures for clothing and footwear expenditures, which 
                                                 
4 See Appendix A for detailed results of the estimated Heckman model. 
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are observed for women and men separately. Expenditures on durables are manually 
classified and excluded from the budget 𝑚 . The non-durable expenditures contain the 
categories food, drinks, tobacco, heating and electricity, mobility, articles of daily use, health 
expenditures, child care, spending for leisure activities and other smaller items. Housing 
expenditures are also included and can either be actually paid rents without heating and 
electricity costs or imputed rents for owner-occupied houses and flats. The imputed rents are 
calculated by the German Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt) and already 
implemented in the EVS data sets.  
 
Price data is supplemented to the survey data with official consumer price indices provided 
by the German Federal Statistical Office. While most expenditure categories in the EVS data 
refer to the two-digit and the four-digit price indices, especially the categories for men’s and 
women’s clothing and footwear are on a more disaggregated level but without an exact match 
in the available price data. I therefore use available ten-digit prices as proxies for these 
categories.5 The monthly price indices are averaged over the quarter to fit the quarterly 
expenditure data. Afterwards, household-specific Stone-Lewbel prices are constructed with 
the price data by weighting the prices with the respective expenditure shares for every 
commodity group to increase price variation (see Section 2.2. for details). There are eight 
points in time, which create price variation (quarterly data for two years). Additional regional 
price variation only comes from the prices for housing, which are differentiated available by 
federal states. 
 
The standard sample of the analysis is restricted to mixed-gender couple households (who 
declare in the data to be a couple) with exactly two adult persons and optionally children 
below the age of 14. Additional criteria is the presence of income from occupation in the 
household from at least one partner. This restriction excludes the households from the 
analysis, which completely rely on transfer income. The reason is that these households could 
be systematically different in their preferences and consumption decision-making from 
households with at least one occupied partner. I end up with 29,461 households, 15,367 from 
the year 2008 and 14,094 from the year 2013. 
                                                 
5 I use the prices for men’s trousers and women’s trousers as proxies for men’s clothing and women’s 
clothing, respectively. Revenue statistics for 2013 from data provider Statista suggest that 
expenditures for trousers are the most relevant expenditure group within clothing expenditures for 
men and women. For the price of men’s footwear, I use the price category „classic or casual shoes for 
men“. The respective price for women’s footwear is called „pumps or casual shoes for women“.    
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Table 3.1:  
Sample descriptives 
 
Variables Mean Standard Deviation 
Budget 2,607.91 1,042.45 
Budget (log) 7.80 0.37 
Expenditures for the commodity groups  
Women's clothing and footwear 77.31 84.96 
Men's clothing and footwear 45.69 59.23 
Composite good 2,484.91 992.21 
Budget shares  
Women's clothing and footwear 0.029 0.027 
Men's clothing and footwear 0.017 0.019 
Composite good 0.954 0.038 
Prices  
Women's clothing and footwear 100.03 3.74 
Men's clothing and footwear 100.46 4.55 
Composite good 102.65 4.07 
Income  
Couple’s gross income 4,626.62 2,331.98 
Women’s income contribution share 0.342 0.235 
Selected control variables  
Women’s age 45.02 12.78 
Men’s age 47.89 13.15 
Married (dummy) 0.831 0.375 
Children in household (dummy) 0.360 0.480 
Number of children (below 14 years) 0.612 0.922 
Owner occupied housing (dummy) 0.647 0.478 
Women’s wage per hour (log) 2.63 0.56 
Men’s wage per hour (log) 2.89 0.56 
Number of observations: 29,461   
Notes: Expenditures and income in euro per month. 
Sources: EVS data 2008, 2013; own calculations. 
 
A potential data issue for the estimation is the existence of zero expenditures in households. 
As in the single equation case, a large share of zeros of the dependent variables can result in a 
biased estimation that can be fixed with a censored regression model.6 However, as the 
model at hand features only three commodity groups, of which the composite good has no zero 
consumption and clothing and footwear are pooled for both partners, the problem should be 
                                                 
6 For the multiple equation case, see e.g. Shonkwiler and Yen (1999) who proposed an estimator for 
censored demand systems. 
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rather minor. In the important equations for clothing and footwear expenditures, the share of 
zeros is 6.9 percent for women, while it is 15.4 percent in the equation for men. 
 
Table 3.1 shows the descriptives of the sample. The total budget of non-durable consumption 
expenditures is about 2,608 euro per month at the mean, which is 73.6 percent of total 
spending on consumption in the sample. The average gross income of the couple households is 
4,627 euro per month, of which the women’s contribution share is 34.2 percent. 
 
A women’s contribution share of zero is found in about ten percent of the households. In 
principle, this could only be a problem in the first stage of the 2SLS approach since 𝑠 appears 
as a dependent variable there. But two issues speak against a different model: Firstly, a 
proportion of ten percent zeros is mostly not considered as harmful in the literature. 
Secondly, a tobit-type approach would be a problem for the implementation of the augmented 
regression since the residuals from stage one would be distributed differently from those of a 
linear model (because the predictions are always positive). However, since the households 
with a women’s income contribution share of zero could systematically vary in their 
preferences for consumption, the model is also run solely with the sample, in which both 




The QUAIDS model is firstly estimated with the ILLE ignoring edogeneity issues regarding 
the women’s income contribution share 𝑠 and the budget 𝑚. The results are discussed and 
compared to those of the 2SLS implementation in the augmented regression setting, which is 
presented secondly. Parameters of interest are, besides the one for 𝑠, the price and budget 
elasticities for the demand system, which can be derived from the estimated parameters. 
 
4.1. Results for the QUAIDS model without endogeneity 
 
Table 4.1 shows the result for the demand system by using the ILLE ignoring endogeneity 
issues and imposing homogeneity in prices. While budget effects are highly significant in all 
three equations, the price effects are only significant in the equations for women’s clothing 
and footwear and for the composite commodity group. Importantly, the coefficients for 
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women’s income contribution share are significant in all equations with a positive sign for 
women’s clothing and footwear and a negative sign for both other commodity groups. The 
system-wide joint test of the coefficients is also highly significant with a chi-squared statistic 
of 211 (with two degrees of freedom because one equation has to be dropped). This result 
implies a rejection of the income pooling hypothesis because a higher income contribution 
share of the woman means a higher consumption of women’s clothing and footwear and a 
lower consumption of men’s for a given household budget.  
 
Table 4.1:  
Estimation results for the demand system without endogeneity 
 







    
Price women's clothing and footwear (log) -0.05732*** -0.01363 0.07095*** 
 (0.01477) (0.01087) (0.02082) 
Price men's clothing and footwear (log) 0.03608** 0.00960 -0.04568** 
 (0.01483) (0.01092) (0.02091) 
Price composite good (log) 0.02124** 0.00402 -0.02526* 
 (0.00949) (0.00696) (0.01340) 
Budget (𝛽) 0.07578*** 0.03855*** -0.11433*** 
 (0.00457) (0.00336) (0.00644) 
Budget squared (𝜆) -0.00968*** -0.00483*** 0.01451*** 
 (0.00071) (0.00052) (0.00100) 
Women's income contribution share (𝜶) 0.00734*** -0.00318*** -0.00416*** 
 (0.00069) (0.00051) (0.00098) 
One child (baseline category: no children) -0.00994*** -0.00711*** 0.01705*** 
 (0.00050) (0.00037) (0.00071) 
Two children -0.01300*** -0.00924*** 0.02224*** 
 (0.00054) (0.00039) (0.00075) 
Three children -0.01520*** -0.01154*** 0.02673*** 
 (0.00089) (0.00066) (0.00126) 
Four or more children -0.01978*** -0.01258*** 0.03236*** 
 (0.00189) (0.00139) (0.00267) 
Married -0.00133*** -0.00068* 0.00201*** 
 (0.00047) (0.00035) (0.00066) 
Owner-occupied housing -0.00306*** -0.00222*** 0.00527*** 
 (0.00036) (0.00027) (0.00051) 
Constant -0.00639 -0.00113 1.00752*** 
 (0.01881) (0.01385) (0.02652) 
Polynomials for the age of both partners, dummies of German 
citizenship, dummies for the federal state, level of agglomeration, 
quarter and survey year 
yes yes yes 
    
N 29,461 29,461 29,461 
R2 0.0899 0.0633 0.1077 
Test on joint significance of coefficients 𝛼, Chi2-statistic (p-value) 210.6 (0.000)   
Sources: EVS data 2008, 2013; own calculations. 
 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, asymptotic variance-covariance matrix according to Blundell and Robin 
(1999). Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. Homogeneity restriction is imposed. 
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To classify the quantity of the effect, it can be evaluated at the mean of the expenditure 
shares. A switchover from zero income contribution to being the sole income earner would 
increase the expenditures on women’s clothing and footwear by 25 percent or nearly 20 euro 
per month. Simultaneously, consumption of men’s clothing and footwear drops by about 19 
percent and the composite good by 0.4 percent. So, the substitution happens mostly between 
the two private goods in this model. 
 
Other control variables are left out in Table 4.1 but are included in all equations. 7 
Importantly, the controls for the presence of children show consistent signs in a way that 
more children in the household reduce the private consumption of both partner. A hint on the 
differences in preferences between married couples and unmarried couples is the significant 
coefficient of the dummy for marriage. In this model, private consumption is lower for 
married couples but further heterogeneity has to be evaluated in Section 4.3.  
 
Price and budget elasticities of the demand system can also be derived from the estimated 
parameters of Table 4.1.8 They are presented in Table B.2 in the Appendix. 
 
4.2. Results for the QUAIDS model with endogeneity 
 
The model can be augmented by allowing for endogeneity of the women’s income contribution 
share and the expenditure budget. Following the approach presented in Section 2.3., the two 
endogenous variables are regressed in a first-stage-SUR model on the instruments. The 




                                                 
7 See Appendix B for the complete estimation results.  
8 The formulas for the elasticities in the QUAIDS can be derived according to Banks et al. (1997) from 
the estimated parameters. The budget elasticities are obtained by 𝜂𝑖 = 1 +
𝜇𝑖
𝑤𝑖






) is the marginal effect with respect to a change in the budget. The uncompensated price 












 is the 
marginal effect with respect to a change of price 𝑗 and 𝛿𝑖𝑗 is the Kronecker delta, which is 1 if 𝑖 = 𝑗 






Table 4.2:  
Estimation results for the first-stage-SUR model 
 
 
Women's income      
contribution share 
Budget (log) 
Price women's clothing and footwear (log) -0.09397 (0.15151) -0.47095** (0.20033) 
Price men's clothing and footwear (log) -0.11896 (0.18736) 0.44190* (0.24116) 
Price composite good (log) -0.10338 (0.08386) -1.11874*** (0.14112) 
Woman's wage per hour (log)   0.09807*** (0.00443) 
Man's wage per hour (log)   0.16685*** (0.00550) 
Baseline category: no school graduation (woman)      
Secondary school (woman) -0.12914** (0.06093) -0.09877 (0.08152) 
Intermediate school-leaving certificate (woman) -0.05529 (0.05719) -0.06303 (0.07982) 
Specialized A-levels (woman) -0.02523 (0.12907) 0.15650 (0.16109) 
A-levels (woman) 0.06781 (0.07628) 0.05980 (0.10778) 
Baseline category: no school graduation (man)     
Secondary school (man) -0.02988 (0.05922) -0.22989** (0.09403) 
Intermediate school-leaving certificate (man) 0.00585 (0.06255) 0.09669 (0.08541) 
Specialized A-levels (man) -0.11047* (0.06222) -0.08753 (0.10179) 
A-levels (man) 0.06999 (0.09839) 0.07075 (0.10056) 
Baseline category: no vocational training (woman)     
Vocational training (woman) 0.08099*** (0.01754) 0.02849 (0.01876) 
Technician (woman) 0.05878** (0.02763) 0.03308 (0.03511) 
College (woman) 0.19446*** (0.03198) 0.16763*** (0.03739) 
University (woman) 0.15551*** (0.02797) 0.09035*** (0.02936) 
Baseline category: no vocational training (man)     
Vocational training (man) -0.08976*** (0.01463) 0.02571 (0.01781) 
Technician (man) -0.09007*** (0.01838) 0.03341 (0.02383) 
College (man) -0.16177*** (0.01660) 0.12298*** (0.02484) 
University (man) -0.17348*** (0.02032) 0.06723** (0.02973) 
     
German citizenship (man) -0.07858*** (0.01124) 0.05870*** (0.01315) 
German citizenship (woman) 0.10291*** (0.00860) 0.11315*** (0.01215) 
One child (baseline category: no children)   0.06780*** (0.00556) 
Two children   0.14404*** (0.00578) 
Three children   0.19817*** (0.00928) 
Four or more children   0.24616*** (0.01955) 
Married   -0.00360 (0.00557) 
Owner-occupied housing   0.15158*** (0.00410) 
Constant 3.91675*** (1.14284) 10.24911*** (1.56608) 
Interaction terms between the type of school graduation 
of both partners and between the type of highest 





N 29,461  29,461  
R2 0.168  0.393  
F-statistic (p-value) 52.3 (0.000)  128.2 (0.000)  
Sources: EVS data 2008, 2013; own calculations. 
 
The estimation results from the first stage are presented in Table 4.2. Since there are in total 
48 dummies and interaction terms of the instruments school graduation and highest 
educational/vocational graduation of both partners, the table is shortened by leaving out the 
results for the interaction terms. 9  Most instrumental dummies are clearly significant, 
although an interpretation is not meaningful without the interaction effects. The wages, 
                                                 
9 See Appendix C for the complete estimation results. 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
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which only appear in the budget equation, are also strongly significant. The F-tests in both 
equations on joint significance of the instruments do not indicate a weak instruments 
problem. Additionally, Shea’s Partial R2 (Shea, 1997) for the women’s income contribution 
share 𝑠 is about 0.086 suggesting a properly high correlation with the instruments. 
 
Table 4.3:  
Estimation results for the demand system with endogenous budget and 
endogenous women’s income contribution share 
 







    
Price women's clothing and footwear (log) -0.06286*** -0.01739 0.08025*** 
 (0.01486) (0.01093) (0.02100) 
Price men's clothing and footwear (log) 0.02060 -0.00086 -0.01974 
 (0.01502) (0.01107) (0.02124) 
Price composite good (log) 0.04226*** 0.01825** -0.06051*** 
 (0.00991) (0.00726) (0.01405) 
Budget (𝛽) 0.08318*** 0.04370*** -0.12688*** 
 (0.00466) (0.00343) (0.00657) 
Budget squared (𝜆) -0.00972*** -0.00486*** 0.01458*** 
 (0.00071) (0.00052) (0.00100) 
Women's income contribution share (𝜶) 0.00506** -0.00702*** 0.00196 
 (0.00236) (0.00174) (0.00333) 
𝜐1 - Women's income contribution share 0.00259 0.00425** -0.00685** 
 (0.00246) (0.00181) (0.00347) 
𝜐2 - Budget -0.00895*** -0.00622*** 0.01516*** 
 (0.00114) (0.00084) (0.00161) 
One child (baseline category: no children) -0.01019*** -0.00727*** 0.01746*** 
 (0.00051) (0.00037) (0.00072) 
Two children -0.01386*** -0.00983*** 0.02368*** 
 (0.00055) (0.00040) (0.00078) 
Three children -0.01653*** -0.01246*** 0.02898*** 
 (0.00091) (0.00067) (0.00129) 
Four or more children -0.02137*** -0.01369*** 0.03506*** 
 (0.00191) (0.00141) (0.00270) 
Married -0.00134*** -0.00067* 0.00201*** 
 (0.00047) (0.00035) (0.00067) 
Owner-occupied housing -0.00448*** -0.00320*** 0.00768*** 
 (0.00041) (0.00030) (0.00058) 
Constant 0.00690 0.01376 0.97934*** 
 (0.01974) (0.01454) (0.02789) 
Polynomials for the age of both partners, dummies of German 
citizenship, dummies for the federal state, level of agglomeration, 
quarter and survey year 
yes yes yes 
    
N 29,461 29,461 29,461 
Shea’s partial R2 between 𝑠 and its instruments  0.086   
Test on joint significance of coefficients of 𝜐1, Chi2-statistic 
(p-value) 
 5.6 (0.060)   
Test on joint significance of coefficients of 𝜐2, Chi2-statistic 
(p-value) 
89.3 (0.000)   
Test on joint significance of coefficients of 𝛼, Chi2-statistic 
(p-value) 
28.3 (0.000)   
Sources: EVS data 2008, 2013; own calculations. 
Notes: Adjusted standard errors in parentheses, asymptotic variance-covariance matrix according to Blundell and 
Robin (1999). Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. Homogeneity restriction is imposed. 
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The test of the income pooling hypothesis in the demand system with endogenous regressors 
remains a significant rejection, although the effect of women’s income contribution share on 
women’s clothing and footwear consumption is smaller compared to the first model (Table 
4.3). The direct effect from a shift in the contribution share from zero to one is now 17,4 
percent more consumption compared to 25 percent in the first model but still significant at 
the 5 percent level. The coefficients are also still jointly significant at the 1 percent level in 
the system of equations. While the significant effect on the consumption of the composite 
good vanishes, the negative one on men’s clothing and footwear becomes even more negative 
inducing a strong rival relationship between the two private goods.   
 
However, the coefficients do not differ substantially from those of the first model. 
Accordingly, the test on exogeneity of women’s income contribution share, which is the test on 
the joint significance of the included residuals, is only significantly rejected at the 10 percent 
level with a p-value of 0.06. A somewhat different picture shows the test on exogeneity of the 
budget, which is strongly rejected. 
 
Table 4.4:  




Uncompensated price elasticity 
Change in the price of… 
Compensated price elasticity 
Change in the price of… 
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Women's clothing 

















































Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. Homogeneity restriction 
is imposed. Elasticities evaluated at sample means. 
19 
 
The corresponding elasticities are presented in Table 4.4, where the dependent variables 
(quantities of demand) can be found in the lines and the columns refer to the exogenous 
variables (the budget and the prices). The budget elasticities are highly significant in all 
equations indicating that the demand for clothing and footwear is budget elastic. They also 
vary significantly from those of the model without endogeneity (see Table B.2 in the 
Appendix). The compensated own-price elasticities are consistently negative for all 
commodity groups with a high own-price elasticity for women’s footwear and clothing of -2.7. 
Because symmetry of price effects is not imposed in the estimation, the cross-price effects are 
mostly not symmetric and can therefore not be interpreted. The only confirmed substitutional 
relationship is found between the composite good and women’s clothing and footwear. While 
the other cross-price effects show non-symmetric signs, they have in both cases only one 
significantly estimated effect with a positive sign indicating substitutional relationships.10 
 
4.3. Heterogeneous effects for married couples and the presence of children  
 
While the income pooling hypothesis is rejected by estimating one marginal effect for all 
couple households, there are still important questions open regarding the heterogeneity in 
the household context. To deal with these questions, the model will be extended with 
interaction effects for married status and the presence of children in the household. 
Additionally, differences in the effects between the former East and West German federal 
states are explored. The underlying model is the augmented regression from Section 4.2 
which accounts for potential endogeneity and allows in principle adding interaction terms 




     
 
                                                 
10 Symmetry cannot be rejected at the 10 percent level in this model. Imposing the restriction would 
give no significant cross-price relationship between both clothing and footwear commodity groups. 
Additionally, the compensated own-price effect for women’s clothing and footwear would shrink to -2, 
while the one for men’s clothing and footwear would rise to weakly significant -1.6. 
11 A different first-stage-SUR model is only estimated if the control variables are changed. For 
example, the dummies for the federal states had to be excluded in the interaction model with a dummy 
for East Germany. Therefore, this was also done in the first stage to have an equivalent specification. 
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Table 4.5:  
Heterogeneous effects for married couples and the presence of children  
 







Composite good Chi2-statistic on 
system 
significance 
Interaction with Married dummy    
     
Women's income contribution share 𝒔 0.01200*** -0.00959*** -0.00241 55.1, 0.000 
 (0.00287) (0.00211) (0.00405)  
Interaction effect: Married ∙ 𝒔 -0.00827*** 0.00307** 0.00521* 22.0, 0.000 
 (0.00194) (0.00143) (0.00274) (combined effect) 
Married 0.00219** -0.00198*** -0.00021 19.0, 0.000 
 (0.00095) (0.00070) (0.00135)  
Interactions with Married and East Germany dummies    
     
Women's income contribution share 𝒔 0.01394*** -0.00762*** -0.00631 45.7, 0.000 
 (0.00307) (0.00226) (0.00434)  
Interaction effect: Married ∙ 𝒔 -0.01146*** 0.00060 0.01085*** 21.2, 0.000 
 (0.00227) (0.00167) (0.00321) (combined effect) 
Interaction effect: East Germany ∙ 𝒔 -0.00836** -0.00744** 0.01581*** 34.8, 0.000 
 (0.00400) (0.00295) (0.00565) (combined effect) 
Int. effect: East Germany ∙ Married ∙ 𝒔 0.01121*** 0.00866*** -0.01987*** 17.9, 0.000  
 (0.00433) (0.00319) (0.00612) (combined effect) 
Married 0.00275** -0.00152* -0.00124 14.0, 0.001 
 (0.00110) (0.00081) (0.00155)  
East Germany 0.00395** 0.00308** -0.00703**  6.6, 0.037 
 (0.00196) (0.00144) (0.00277)  
Int. effect: East Germany ∙ Married -0.00233 -0.00189 0.00423  2.1, 0.347 
 (0.00209) (0.00154) (0.00295)  
Interaction with At least one child in the household dummy   
     
Women's income contribution share 𝒔 0.00731*** -0.00656*** -0.00074 33.1, 0.000 
 (0.00240) (0.00177) (0.00339)  
Interaction effect: At least one child ∙ 𝒔 -0.00712*** -0.00143 0.00855*** 20.2, 0.000 
 (0.00141) (0.00104) (0.00200) (combined effect) 
At least one child -0.00768*** -0.00677*** 0.01445*** 218.8, 0.000 
 (0.00071) (0.00052) (0.00100)  
Interactions with Married and At least one child in the household dummies  
     
Women's income contribution share 𝒔 0.01385*** -0.01092*** -0.00293 63.9, 0.000 
 (0.00305) (0.00225) (0.00431)  
Interaction effect: At least one child ∙ 𝒔 -0.01032** 0.00218 0.00814 10.3, 0.006 
 (0.00431) (0.00317) (0.00608) (combined effect) 
Interaction effect: Married ∙ 𝒔 -0.00808*** 0.00509*** 0.00299 23.2, 0.000 
 (0.00227) (0.00167) (0.00321) (combined effect) 
Int. effect: At least one child ∙ Married ∙ 𝒔 0.00442 -0.00387 -0.00055 17.2, 0.000 
 (0.00456) (0.00336) (0.00644) (combined effect) 
At least one child -0.00729*** -0.01020*** 0.01749*** 53.8, 0.000 
 (0.00194) (0.00143) (0.00274)  
Married 0.00167 -0.00372*** 0.00205 26.9, 0.000 
 (0.00117) (0.00087) (0.00166)  
Int. effect: At least one child ∙ Married -0.00050 0.00416*** -0.00366  9.1, 0.011 
 (0.00203) (0.00149) (0.00286)  
Sources: EVS data 2008, 2013; own calculations. 
 
 
Notes: Adjusted standard errors in parentheses, asymptotic variance-covariance matrix according to Blundell and 
Robin (1999). Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. Homogeneity restriction is imposed. The right 
column contains p-values of the chi-squared test. 
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Four different interaction models are estimated with different specifications and presented in 
Table 4.5. The first model incorporates an interaction term for married couples allowing 
women’s income contribution to have varying effects for married and unmarried couples. The 
effects on both “private” goods are significantly higher for unmarried couples. This result is 
confirmed with the system-wide chi-squared test which has a much higher statistic for 
unmarried couples (main coefficient), although the hypothesis remains rejected for married 
ones (main coefficient and interaction effect combined). Married couples are thus nearer to 
the theoretical construct of pooling. 
 
Interestingly, there are substantial differences between the former East and West German 
federal states. The effect on women’s clothing and footwear is smaller for unmarried couples 
in East Germany compared to West Germany, while the effect on men’s clothing and footwear 
is much larger. Consequently, there is more substitution between the composite good and 
men’s private good. The test signalizes a less strong rejection in the East. However, the status 
of marriage reduces the effects in both regions bringing about a low chi-squared statistic. 
 
An effect similar compared to the one found for married couples appears in the model with an 
interaction term for the presence of at least one child in the household (below 14 years old). 
There is no effect left on women’s clothing and footwear consumption but a high effect on 
men’s. Without children the substitution happens almost exclusively between the private 
goods. But contrary to the model with a term for marriage, the expenditure shares of the 
private goods are both significantly lower with the presence of at least one child which 
indicates a large preference shift toward the composite commodity group. This is plausible 
because the expenditures on goods for children are contained in this group. However, it could 
be the case that all pure privately consumed goods for the adults are equally devaluated with 
the presence of children, which means there is still explanatory power to the test indicating 
substitution between men’s consumption and the composite good dependent on women’s 
income contribution. The chi-squared statistic has a similar low value as in the models with 
an interaction term for marriage.  
 
The combination of marriage and the presence of at least one child confirms the found 
results. Interestingly, the constellation which is nearest to perfect income pooling according 
to the chi-squared test is an unmarried couple with at least one child. Though, this result is 
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mainly driven by higher standard errors, as the differences between this case and the 
combination with marriage are not significant.  
 
4.4. Robustness checks 
 
A person’s preference for clothing and footwear could depend on the occupational status in a 
way that expenditures could potentially be higher for occupied persons than for unemployed, 
or that they could be higher in higher paid jobs than in low income jobs. As the main 
specification of the model features couples with the presence of income from occupation in the 
household from at least one partner, this could be a factor in the hypothesis test. The 
instrumentation of the income contribution share should tackle the problem sufficiently as it 
only depends on educational backgrounds and not on actual occupational status in 
consequence. However, there could potentially be a correlation left between the preferences 
for clothing/footwear and unobserved factors regarding the occupational status because 
educational information is too broadly defined (e.g. not specifying the potential job positions).     
 
Therefore, two robustness checks are done: Firstly, the sample is restricted to both partners 
having market income (and thus being occupied) and secondly to women’s income 
contribution shares lying between 0.2 and 0.8, which gives both partners a significant 
contribution to the household budget. The first check should clarify the influence of a 
preference shift from (non-)occupation of a partner, while the second one should evaluate the 
situation in which both incomes are not too far different from each other.12 The first stage 
remains in both checks the same as in the main specification to avoid selection effects in the 
coefficients of the instruments. 
 
The results for the parameters 𝛼 are presented in Table 4.6. For a better comparison with 
the initial parameters from the IV model of Table 4.3, these are repeated in the first rows. In 
the first robustness check with both partners having positive market income, the effect on 
women’s clothing and footwear is smaller and insignificant while the one on men’s 
expenditures is larger. In consequence, there is more substitution between men’s 
consumption and the composite good, but a rejection of the hypothesis. This result is even 
stronger if the sample is restricted to 𝑠 lying between 0.2 and 0.8. Since the average share of 
                                                 
12 See Appendix D for detailed estimation results.  
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women’s income contribution is increasing going from the original model to the first and 
second robustness check, there is a possibly nonlinear effect on consumption pattern. For low 
values of 𝑠, there is a positive effect on women’s clothing and footwear consumption. For 
higher values, the effect becomes stronger for other goods contained in the composite good 
and lower for clothing and footwear. However, the rejection of the income pooling hypothesis 
persists in any case, since the negative relationship between women’s share and men’s 
private consumption holds.     
 
Table 4.6:  
Robustness checks: Different samples 
 







Composite good Chi2-statistic on 
system 
significance 
     
Original effects (IV), N = 29,461     
     
Women's income contribution share (𝛼) 0.00506** -0.00702*** 0.00196 28.9, 0.000 
 (0.00236) (0.00174) (0.00333)  
𝜐1  0.00259 0.00425** -0.00685**  5.6, 0.060 
 (0.00246) (0.00181) (0.00347)  
     
Sample restriction on both partners having positive market incomes, N = 19,322  
     
Women's income contribution share (𝛼) 0.00405 -0.00981*** 0.00576 26.6, 0.000 
 (0.00304) (0.00227) (0.00433)   
𝜐1  0.00346 0.00596** -0.00942**  6.4, 0.040 
 (0.00317) (0.00237) (0.00451)  
     
Sample restriction on 𝒔 lying between 0.2 and 0.8, N = 19,257   
     
Women's income contribution share (𝛼) 0.00299 -0.01245*** 0.00946** 36.1, 0.000 
 (0.00324) (0.00233) (0.00454)  
𝜐1  0.00370 0.00668*** -0.01038**  8.1, 0.017 
 (0.00327) (0.00235) (0.00459)  
     




The validity of the income pooling hypothesis has important implications for social and tax 
policy as well as for inequality research. In this paper, I provide a test of the income pooling 
hypothesis using administrative cross-sectional survey data on German couple households. I 
Notes: Adjusted standard errors in parentheses, asymptotic variance-covariance matrix according to Blundell and 
Robin (1999). Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. Homogeneity restriction is imposed. The right 
column contains p-values of the chi-squared test. 
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use information on expenditures and individual incomes to test the hypothesis in a structural 
consumer demand system. While most expenditures are only observed at the household level 
in the survey, expenditures on clothing and footwear are separately available for women and 
men and can be taken as proxies for individual consumption within the couple household.  
 
According to the hypothesis, household consumption decisions should only depend on the 
household budget, prices and taste shifters. The individual income contribution share should 
therefore have no effect on consumption patterns, which can be tested within the framework 
of a Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System (QUAIDS). I expand the model by controlling for 
endogeneity of the expenditure budget and the individual income contribution shares in an 
instrumental variables approach. Additionally, heterogenous effects are evaluated according 
to household attributes. 
 
Although the hypothesis is broadly rejected, which implies a relationship between individual 
income contribution and individual consumption, there are significant differences regarding 
the marital status, the presence of at least one child in the household and whether the 
household is located in a former West or East German federal state. Married couples and 
couples with children are more closely to the acceptance of the hypothesis than unmarried 
couples without children. Unmarried couples in a former East German federal states are 
closer to income pooling than in former West German states. A negative effect of women’s 
income contribution on men’s clothing and footwear consumption is confirmed in all 
specifications, which has a positive effect on women’s consumption and the composite good.  
 
Since perfect income pooling is even rejected for married couples, this result has implications 
for income taxation. It justifies a limitation of joint assessment of couples, e.g. a limited 
offsetting of income differences between the spouses or different individual marginal tax 
rates in general. Additionally, tax and social policy should consider an equal treatment of 
couples with children regardless of the marital status because the differences in income 
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The wages for women and men are used in the first stage of the instrumental variables 
approach. Since the wages are not observed for those that are not working, they have to be 
imputed to estimate the model on all observations in the sample. For this purpose, a classic 
Heckman model is estimated for women and men separately to impute wages for the missing 
cases. The underlying sample of couple households is the same as the one for the demand 
system estimation.  
 
Table A.1:  
Heckman model: Women 
 
    
 Log Wage per hour Work =1  
    
     
Age 0.06189*** (0.01211) 0.09793 (0.15118) 
Age squared -0.00050*** (0.00014) -0.00448 (0.00550) 
Age cubic   0.00011 (0.00009) 
Age quartic   -0.00000** (0.00000) 
Partner's age   0.00562 (0.00759) 
Partner's age squared   -0.00013* (0.00007) 
Baseline category: no vocational training     
Vocational training (2) 0.58934** (0.24270) 0.15086* (0.08512) 
Technician (3) 0.65796** (0.31513) 0.01815 (0.15085) 
College (4) 0.43722 (0.30037) 0.81753*** (0.18008) 
University (5) 0.08044 (0.29231) 0.37141*** (0.13057) 
Interaction terms     
Interaction: Vocational training x age -0.01201 (0.01260)   
Interaction: Technician x age -0.01471 (0.01555)   
Interaction: College x age -0.00087 (0.01519)   
Interaction: University x age 0.01970 (0.01483)   
Interaction: Vocational training x age squared 0.00005 (0.00015)   
Interaction: Technician x age squared 0.00011 (0.00018)   
Interaction: College x age squared -0.00002 (0.00018)   
Interaction: University x age squared -0.00022 (0.00017)   
Baseline category: partner has no vocational training     
Partner’s graduation: Vocational training (2)   -0.05971 (0.07541) 
Partner’s graduation: Technician (3)   -0.04921 (0.10751) 
Partner’s graduation: College (4)   0.04234 (0.10368) 
Partner’s graduation: University (5)   0.12450 (0.11685) 
Interaction terms     
Interaction educational graduation 2 (own) x 2 (partner)   0.24223** (0.09498) 
Interaction educational graduation 2 x 3   0.24185* (0.12386) 
Interaction educational graduation 2 x 4   0.13018 (0.12091) 
Interaction educational graduation 2 x 5   -0.00339 (0.13454) 
Interaction educational graduation 3 x 2   0.62338*** (0.16047) 
Interaction educational graduation 3 x 3   0.57513*** (0.17778) 
Interaction educational graduation 3 x 4   0.42714** (0.17941) 
Interaction educational graduation 3 x 5   0.30978 (0.18852) 
Interaction educational graduation 4 x 2   0.03282 (0.19034) 
Interaction educational graduation 4 x 3   0.14430 (0.21149) 
Interaction educational graduation 4 x 4   -0.16620 (0.20127) 
Interaction educational graduation 4 x 5   -0.31622 (0.21066) 
Interaction educational graduation 5 x 2   0.21249 (0.14565) 
Interaction educational graduation 5 x 3   0.28633* (0.17237) 
Interaction educational graduation 5 x 4   0.19310 (0.16231) 
Interaction educational graduation 5 x 5   0.08174 (0.16619) 
     
German citizenship 0.05153 (0.03356) 0.59728*** (0.04746) 
Partner has German citizenship   -0.02569 (0.05573) 
Married (baseline category: single) -0.03672** (0.01587) -0.29201*** (0.03151) 
Widowed -0.06036 (0.07458) -0.41168*** (0.11547) 
Divorced -0.06045** (0.03027) -0.13179** (0.05932) 
Permanently separated -0.17778** (0.07407) 0.29775* (0.17948) 
East Germany -0.18964*** (0.03462) 0.23317*** (0.06077) 
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Baseline category: population < 5,000     
Population between 5,000 and 20,000 0.04916*** (0.01432) 0.03000 (0.02455) 
Population between 20,000 and 100,000 0.05697*** (0.01488) 0.02177 (0.02566) 
Population over 100,000 0.07945*** (0.01618) 0.03745 (0.02818) 
Student 0.04225 (0.05127) -1.66974*** (0.05905) 
Civil servant 0.10634*** (0.01485)   
One child (baseline category: no children)   -0.63297*** (0.02797) 
Two children   -0.79272*** (0.02925) 
Three children   -1.26564*** (0.04592) 
Four or more children   -1.47939*** (0.09707) 
Constant 0.96547*** (0.23956) -1.05446 (1.50307) 
     
Dummies for the federal state, quarter and year  yes  yes  
     
Observations 31,260    
Selected 19,429    
Nonselected 11,831    
Lambda -0.38597***         (0.02491)   
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Sources: EVS data 2008, 2013; own calculations. 
    
 
Table A.2:  
Heckman model: Men 
 
    
 Log Wage per hour Work =1  
    
     
Age 0.08111*** (0.01127) 1.45959*** (0.20562) 
Age squared -0.00087*** (0.00014) -0.05801*** (0.00734) 
Age cubic   0.00098*** (0.00011) 
Age quartic   -0.00001*** (0.00000) 
Partner's age   0.00879 (0.01003) 
Partner's age squared   -0.00016 (0.00011) 
Baseline category: no vocational training     
Vocational training (2) 0.60998*** (0.22967) 0.25738*** (0.08319) 
Technician (3) 0.58928** (0.28047) 0.11924 (0.12145) 
College (4) 0.73314*** (0.25665) 0.65054*** (0.12519) 
University (5) 0.16217 (0.26030) 0.48295*** (0.13400) 
Interaction terms     
Interaction: Vocational training x age -0.01227 (0.01166)   
Interaction: Technician x age -0.00104 (0.01365)   
Interaction: College x age -0.00430 (0.01276)   
Interaction: University x age 0.02412* (0.01290)   
Interaction: Vocational training x age squared 0.00010 (0.00014)   
Interaction: Technician x age squared -0.00006 (0.00016)   
Interaction: College x age squared 0.00005 (0.00015)   
Interaction: University x age squared -0.00024 (0.00015)   
Baseline category: partner has no vocational training     
Partner’s graduation: Vocational training (2)   0.07127 (0.09212) 
Partner’s graduation: Technician (3)   0.16231 (0.16752) 
Partner’s graduation: College (4)   -0.04199 (0.16293) 
Partner’s graduation: University (5)   0.23993* (0.13764) 
Interaction terms     
Interaction educational graduation 2 (own) x 2 (partner)   0.16175 (0.10458) 
Interaction educational graduation 2 x 3   0.13729 (0.17883) 
Interaction educational graduation 2 x 4   0.33672* (0.17727) 
Interaction educational graduation 2 x 5   -0.08784 (0.15557) 
Interaction educational graduation 3 x 2   0.30183** (0.13940) 
Interaction educational graduation 3 x 3   0.22471 (0.19962) 
Interaction educational graduation 3 x 4   0.46965** (0.20546) 
Interaction educational graduation 3 x 5   0.05474 (0.18783) 
Interaction educational graduation 4 x 2   0.00523 (0.14366) 
Interaction educational graduation 4 x 3   -0.13876 (0.20839) 
Interaction educational graduation 4 x 4   0.24727 (0.20028) 
Interaction educational graduation 4 x 5   -0.35416* (0.18346) 
Interaction educational graduation 5 x 2   0.12427 (0.15439) 
Interaction educational graduation 5 x 3   0.12369 (0.21558) 
Interaction educational graduation 5 x 4   0.31263 (0.20862) 
Interaction educational graduation 5 x 5   -0.07990 (0.18355) 
     
German citizenship 0.19657*** (0.02489) 0.44816*** (0.05983) 
Partner has German citizenship   0.15327*** (0.05671) 
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Married (baseline category: single) 0.07515*** (0.01036) 0.13149*** (0.03523) 
Widowed -0.38595*** (0.11491) -0.16545 (0.23720) 
Divorced -0.06948*** (0.02201) -0.07127 (0.06066) 
Permanently separated 0.03579 (0.05815) 0.05902 (0.15817) 
East Germany -0.24787*** (0.02556) -0.02326 (0.07392) 
Baseline category: population < 5,000     
Population between 5,000 and 20,000 0.03407*** (0.01038) 0.06368** (0.02955) 
Population between 20,000 and 100,000 0.03976*** (0.01084) 0.06067** (0.03066) 
Population over 100,000 0.03159*** (0.01178) -0.01317 (0.03346) 
Student -0.64078*** (0.05072) -1.98636*** (0.06914) 
Civil servant -0.05653*** (0.00960)   
One child (baseline category: no children)   -0.07814** (0.03275) 
Two children   -0.03939 (0.03484) 
Three children   -0.21018*** (0.05655) 
Four or more children   -0.35377*** (0.11213) 
Constant 0.39361* (0.22616) -13.09894*** (2.09765) 
     
Dummies for the federal state, quarter and year  yes  yes  
     
Observations 27,950    
Selected 22,012    
Nonselected  5,938    
Lambda 0.111***           (0.03559)   
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 






Table B.1:  
Estimation results for the demand system without endogeneity 
 




Men's clothing and 
footwear 
Composite good 
    
Price women's clothing and footwear (log) -0.05732*** -0.01363 0.07095*** 
 (0.01477) (0.01087) (0.02082) 
Price men's clothing and footwear (log) 0.03608** 0.00960 -0.04568** 
 (0.01483) (0.01092) (0.02091) 
Price composite good (log) 0.02124** 0.00402 -0.02526* 
 (0.00949) (0.00696) (0.01340) 
Budget (𝛽) 0.07578*** 0.03855*** -0.11433*** 
 (0.00457) (0.00336) (0.00644) 
Budget squared (𝜆) -0.00968*** -0.00483*** 0.01451*** 
 (0.00071) (0.00052) (0.00100) 
Woman's income contribution share (𝛼) 0.00734*** -0.00318*** -0.00416*** 
 (0.00069) (0.00051) (0.00098) 
One child (baseline category: no children) -0.00994*** -0.00711*** 0.01705*** 
 (0.00050) (0.00037) (0.00071) 
Two children -0.01300*** -0.00924*** 0.02224*** 
 (0.00054) (0.00039) (0.00075) 
Three children -0.01520*** -0.01154*** 0.02673*** 
 (0.00089) (0.00066) (0.00126) 
Four or more children -0.01978*** -0.01258*** 0.03236*** 
 (0.00189) (0.00139) (0.00267) 
Married -0.00133*** -0.00068* 0.00201*** 
 (0.00047) (0.00035) (0.00066) 
Woman's age -0.00514*** -0.00056 0.00570** 
 (0.00183) (0.00135) (0.00258) 
Woman's age squared 0.00016*** 0.00002 -0.00019** 
 (0.00006) (0.00004) (0.00008) 
Woman's age cubic -0.00000*** -0.00000 0.00000** 
 (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
Woman's age quartic 0.00000** 0.00000 -0.00000** 
 (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
Man's age -0.00311* -0.00303** 0.00614** 
 (0.00187) (0.00138) (0.00264) 
Man's age squared 0.00007 0.00008* -0.00015* 
 (0.00006) (0.00004) (0.00008) 
Man's age cubic -0.00000 -0.00000 0.00000 
 (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
Man's age quartic 0.00000 0.00000 -0.00000 
 (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
Man German citizenship 0.00004 0.00042 -0.00046 
 (0.00093) (0.00069) (0.00131) 
Woman German citizenship 0.00028 -0.00052 0.00024 
 (0.00107) (0.00078) (0.00150) 
Owner-occupied housing -0.00306*** -0.00222*** 0.00527*** 
 (0.00036) (0.00027) (0.00051) 
Year 2013 (baseline category: year 2008) 0.00106*** 0.00064** -0.00170*** 
 (0.00040) (0.00030) (0.00057) 
2nd quarter (baseline category: 1st quarter) 0.00264*** 0.00059* -0.00323*** 
 (0.00045) (0.00033) (0.00064) 
3rd quarter 0.00074* 0.00005 -0.00079 
 (0.00042) (0.00031) (0.00059) 
4th quarter 0.00448*** 0.00336*** -0.00784*** 
 (0.00050) (0.00037) (0.00070) 
Constant -0.00639 -0.00113 1.00752*** 
 (0.01881) (0.01385) (0.02652) 
    
Dummies for the federal state and level of agglomeration yes yes yes 
    
N 29,461 29,461 29,461 
R2 0.0899 0.0633 0.1077 
Test on joint significance of coefficients α, Chi2-statistic (p-value) 210.6 (0.000)   
Sources: EVS data 2008, 2013; own calculations. 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, asymptotic variance-covariance matrix according to Blundell and Robin (1999).                
Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. Homogeneity restriction is imposed. 
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Table B.2:  




Uncompensated price elasticity 
Change in the price of… 
Compensated price elasticity 
Change in the price of… 
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Women's clothing 


















































Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. Homogeneity restriction 





Table C.1:  
Estimation results for the first-stage-SUR model 
 
 
Women's income contribution share Budget (log) 
     
Price women's clothing and footwear (log) -0.09397 (0.15151) -0.47095** (0.20033) 
Price men's clothing and footwear (log) -0.11896 (0.18736) 0.44190* (0.24116) 
Price composite good (log) -0.10338 (0.08386) -1.11874*** (0.14112) 
Woman's wage per hour (log)   0.09807*** (0.00443) 
Man's wage per hour (log)   0.16685*** (0.00550) 
Baseline category: no school graduation (woman)     
Secondary school - 2 (woman) -0.12914** (0.06093) -0.09877 (0.08152) 
Intermediate school-leaving certificate - 3 (woman) -0.05529 (0.05719) -0.06303 (0.07982) 
Specialized A-levels - 4 (woman) -0.02523 (0.12907) 0.15650 (0.16109) 
A-levels - 5 (woman) 0.06781 (0.07628) 0.05980 (0.10778) 
Baseline category: no school graduation (man)     
Secondary school - 2 (man) -0.02988 (0.05922) -0.22989** (0.09403) 
Intermediate school-leaving certificate - 3 (man) 0.00585 (0.06255) 0.09669 (0.08541) 
Specialized A-levels - 4 (man) -0.11047* (0.06222) -0.08753 (0.10179) 
A-levels - 5 (man) 0.06999 (0.09839) 0.07075 (0.10056) 
Interaction terms     
Interaction school graduation 2 (woman) x 2 (man) 0.11408 (0.07257) 0.27040*** (0.10230) 
Interaction school graduation 2 x 3 0.05802 (0.07531) 0.01217 (0.09491) 
Interaction school graduation 2 x 4 0.19345*** (0.07487) 0.22595** (0.11082) 
Interaction school graduation 2 x 5 0.02046 (0.10630) 0.08718 (0.11150) 
Interaction school graduation 3 x 2 0.09133 (0.06930) 0.28576*** (0.10082) 
Interaction school graduation 3 x 3 0.03830 (0.06984) -0.00030 (0.09306) 
Interaction school graduation 3 x 4 0.16368** (0.07133) 0.19490* (0.10785) 
Interaction school graduation 3 x 5 -0.01416 (0.10484) 0.06876 (0.10648) 
Interaction school graduation 4 x 2 0.07404 (0.13437) 0.11269 (0.17509) 
Interaction school graduation 4 x 3 0.03342 (0.13405) -0.17472 (0.17186) 
Interaction school graduation 4 x 4 0.14587 (0.13705) -0.01775 (0.17641) 
Interaction school graduation 4 x 5 -0.03525 (0.15763) -0.14772 (0.17434) 
Interaction school graduation 5 x 2 -0.00310 (0.08588) 0.21743* (0.12486) 
Interaction school graduation 5 x 3 -0.06187 (0.08671) -0.06995 (0.12028) 
Interaction school graduation 5 x 4 0.05013 (0.08982) 0.11226 (0.13084) 
Interaction school graduation 5 x 5 -0.12409 (0.11674) -0.03293 (0.12937) 
Baseline category: no vocational training (woman)     
Vocational training - 2 (woman) 0.08099*** (0.01754) 0.02849 (0.01876) 
Technician - 3 (woman) 0.05878** (0.02763) 0.03308 (0.03511) 
College - 4 (woman) 0.19446*** (0.03198) 0.16763*** (0.03739) 
University - 5 (woman) 0.15551*** (0.02797) 0.09035*** (0.02936) 
Baseline category: no vocational training (man)     
Vocational training - 2 (man) -0.08976*** (0.01463) 0.02571 (0.01781) 
Technician - 3 (man) -0.09007*** (0.01838) 0.03341 (0.02383) 
College - 4 (man) -0.16177*** (0.01660) 0.12298*** (0.02484) 
University - 5 (man) -0.17348*** (0.02032) 0.06723** (0.02973) 
Interaction terms     
Interaction educational graduation 2 (woman) x 2 (man) -0.00354 (0.01904) 0.01399 (0.02123) 
Interaction educational graduation 2 x 3 -0.03986* (0.02203) 0.01674 (0.02715) 
Interaction educational graduation 2 x 4 -0.01750 (0.02030) -0.03041 (0.02786) 
Interaction educational graduation 2 x 5 -0.02003 (0.02363) 0.03759 (0.03333) 
Interaction educational graduation 3 x 2 0.07631*** (0.02899) 0.02805 (0.03747) 
Interaction educational graduation 3 x 3 0.05374* (0.03087) 0.01438 (0.03962) 
Interaction educational graduation 3 x 4 0.03996 (0.03029) -0.05742 (0.04115) 
Interaction educational graduation 3 x 5 0.04032 (0.03339) 0.03254 (0.04413) 
Interaction educational graduation 4 x 2 -0.00915 (0.03372) -0.07956** (0.03910) 
Interaction educational graduation 4 x 3 -0.02709 (0.03619) -0.06006 (0.04291) 
Interaction educational graduation 4 x 4 -0.03823 (0.03360) -0.12953*** (0.04336) 
Interaction educational graduation 4 x 5 -0.06811* (0.03638) -0.06740 (0.04617) 
Interaction educational graduation 5 x 2 0.00973 (0.03002) -0.02002 (0.03295) 
Interaction educational graduation 5 x 3 -0.02336 (0.03252) -0.01989 (0.03838) 
Interaction educational graduation 5 x 4 0.02379 (0.03048) -0.08430** (0.03560) 
Interaction educational graduation 5 x 5 -0.00101 (0.03229) 0.00871 (0.03848) 
     
German citizenship (man) -0.07858*** (0.01124) 0.05870*** (0.01315) 
German citizenship (woman) 0.10291*** (0.00860) 0.11315*** (0.01215) 
One child (baseline category: no children)   0.06780*** (0.00556) 
Two children   0.14404*** (0.00578) 
Three children   0.19817*** (0.00928) 
Four or more children   0.24616*** (0.01955) 
Married   -0.00360 (0.00557) 
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Woman's age -0.11246*** (0.01478) 0.05120** (0.02315) 
Woman's age squared 0.00393*** (0.00048) -0.00128* (0.00076) 
Woman's age cubic -0.00006*** (0.00001) 0.00001 (0.00001) 
Woman's age quartic 0.00000*** (0.00000) -0.00000 (0.00000) 
Man's age -0.06456*** (0.01658) 0.05989*** (0.02244) 
Man's age squared 0.00114** (0.00052) -0.00181** (0.00071) 
Man's age cubic -0.00001 (0.00001) 0.00002** (0.00001) 
Man's age quartic -0.00000 (0.00000) -0.00000** (0.00000) 
Owner-occupied housing   0.15158*** (0.00410) 
Constant 3.91675*** (1.14284) 10.24911*** (1.56608) 
     
Dummies for the federal state and level of agglomeration yes  yes  
     
N 29,461  29,461  
R2 0.168  0.393  
F-statistic (p-value) 52.3 (0.000)  128.2 (0.000)  
                                 
Sources: EVS data 2008, 2013; own calculations. 
 
 
Table C.2:  
Estimation results for the demand system with endogenous budget and 
endogenous women’s income contribution share 
 




Men's clothing and 
footwear 
Composite good 
    
Price women's clothing and footwear (log) -0.06286*** -0.01739 0.08025*** 
 (0.01486) (0.01093) (0.02100) 
Price men's clothing and footwear (log) 0.02060 -0.00086 -0.01974 
 (0.01502) (0.01107) (0.02124) 
Price composite good (log) 0.04226*** 0.01825** -0.06051*** 
 (0.00991) (0.00726) (0.01405) 
Budget (𝛽) 0.08318*** 0.04370*** -0.12688*** 
 (0.00466) (0.00343) (0.00657) 
Budget squared (𝜆) -0.00972*** -0.00486*** 0.01458*** 
 (0.00071) (0.00052) (0.00100) 
Women's income contribution share (𝛼) 0.00506** -0.00702*** 0.00196 
 (0.00236) (0.00174) (0.00333) 
𝜐1 - Women's income contribution share 0.00259 0.00425** -0.00685** 
 (0.00246) (0.00181) (0.00347) 
𝜐2 - Budget -0.00895*** -0.00622*** 0.01516*** 
 (0.00114) (0.00084) (0.00161) 
One child (baseline category: no children) -0.01019*** -0.00727*** 0.01746*** 
 (0.00051) (0.00037) (0.00072) 
Two children -0.01386*** -0.00983*** 0.02368*** 
 (0.00055) (0.00040) (0.00078) 
Three children -0.01653*** -0.01246*** 0.02898*** 
 (0.00091) (0.00067) (0.00129) 
Four or more children -0.02137*** -0.01369*** 0.03506*** 
 (0.00191) (0.00141) (0.00270) 
Married -0.00134*** -0.00067* 0.00201*** 
 (0.00047) (0.00035) (0.00067) 
Woman's age -0.00645*** -0.00165 0.00810*** 
 (0.00185) (0.00136) (0.00262) 
Woman's age squared 0.00020*** 0.00006 -0.00026*** 
 (0.00006) (0.00004) (0.00008) 
Woman's age cubic -0.00000*** -0.00000 0.00000*** 
 (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
Woman's age quartic 0.00000*** 0.00000 -0.00000*** 
 (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
Man's age -0.00432** -0.00409*** 0.00842*** 
 (0.00190) (0.00140) (0.00268) 
Man's age squared 0.00010* 0.00010** -0.00021** 
 (0.00006) (0.00004) (0.00008) 
Man's age cubic -0.00000 -0.00000** 0.00000** 
 (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
Man's age quartic 0.00000 0.00000 -0.00000 
 (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
Man German citizenship -0.00038 0.00037 0.00001 
 (0.00097) (0.00071) (0.00137) 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
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Woman German citizenship -0.00065 -0.00138* 0.00204 
 (0.00110) (0.00081) (0.00155) 
Owner-occupied housing -0.00448*** -0.00320*** 0.00768*** 
 (0.00041) (0.00030) (0.00058) 
Year 2013 (baseline category: year 2008) 0.00124*** 0.00079*** -0.00202*** 
 (0.00040) (0.00030) (0.00057) 
2nd quarter (baseline category: 1st quarter) 0.00275*** 0.00068** -0.00343*** 
 (0.00045) (0.00033) (0.00064) 
3rd quarter 0.00027 -0.00026 -0.00002 
 (0.00043) (0.00031) (0.00060) 
4th quarter 0.00449*** 0.00337*** -0.00786*** 
 (0.00050) (0.00037) (0.00070) 
Constant 0.00690 0.01376 0.97934*** 
 (0.01974) (0.01454) (0.02789) 
    
Dummies for the federal state and level of agglomeration yes yes yes 
    
N 29,461 29,461 29,461 
Shea’s partial R2 between 𝑠 and its instruments 0.086   
Test on joint significance of coefficients of 𝜐1, Chi2-statistic (p-value)  5.6 (0.060)   
Test on joint significance of coefficients of 𝜐2, Chi2-statistic (p-value) 89.3 (0.000)   
Test on joint significance of coefficients of 𝛼, Chi2-statistic (p-value) 28.3 (0.000)   
Sources: EVS data 2008, 2013; own calculations. 
 
Notes: Adjusted standard errors in parentheses, asymptotic variance-covariance matrix according to Blundell and Robin (1999).       





The robustness checks are two different sample restrictions to the IV model. Firstly, the 
sample is restricted to both partners having market income (Table D.1) and secondly to a 
women’s income contribution share lying between 0.2 and 0.8, which gives both partners a 
significant contribution to the household budget (Table D.2). The first stage is in both cases 
estimated with the original sample (Table C.1). 
 
Table D.1:  
Robustness check: Sample restriction on both partners having positive market 
incomes 
 




Men's clothing and 
footwear 
Composite good 
    
Price women's clothing and footwear (log) -0.04482** -0.01594 0.06076** 
 (0.01897) (0.01412) (0.02697) 
Price men's clothing and footwear (log) 0.00282 -0.00580 0.00298 
 (0.01919) (0.01432) (0.02730) 
Price composite good (log) 0.04201*** 0.02174** -0.06375*** 
 (0.01278) (0.00948) (0.01822) 
Budget (𝛽) 0.08109*** 0.04334*** -0.12443*** 
 (0.00643) (0.00479) (0.00912) 
Budget squared (𝜆) -0.00940*** -0.00471*** 0.01411*** 
 (0.00097) (0.00073) (0.00138) 
Women's income contribution share (𝛼) 0.00405 -0.00981*** 0.00576 
 (0.00304) (0.00227) (0.00433) 
𝜐1 - Women's income contribution share 0.00346 0.00596** -0.00942** 
 (0.00317) (0.00237) (0.00451) 
𝜐2 - Budget -0.00908*** -0.00664*** 0.01571*** 
 (0.00141) (0.00105) (0.00201) 
One child (baseline category: no children) -0.01017*** -0.00765*** 0.01782*** 
 (0.00060) (0.00045) (0.00085) 
Two children -0.01383*** -0.01035*** 0.02418*** 
 (0.00066) (0.00049) (0.00093) 
Three children -0.01738*** -0.01350*** 0.03088*** 
 (0.00120) (0.00090) (0.00171) 
Four or more children -0.02008*** -0.01408*** 0.03416*** 
 (0.00284) (0.00212) (0.00403) 
Married -0.00210*** -0.00082** 0.00292*** 
 (0.00056) (0.00042) (0.00080) 
Woman's age -0.00090 -0.00198 0.00289 
 (0.00289) (0.00215) (0.00410) 
Woman's age squared 0.00000 0.00006 -0.00007 
 (0.00010) (0.00007) (0.00014) 
Woman's age cubic 0.00000 -0.00000 0.00000 
 (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
Woman's age quartic -0.00000 0.00000 -0.00000 
 (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
Man's age -0.00988*** -0.00492** 0.01479*** 
 (0.00294) (0.00220) (0.00418) 
Man's age squared 0.00028*** 0.00013* -0.00042*** 
 (0.00010) (0.00007) (0.00014) 
Man's age cubic -0.00000*** -0.00000 0.00001*** 
 (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
Man's age quartic 0.00000** 0.00000 -0.00000** 
 (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
Man German citizenship -0.00012 0.00099 -0.00087 
 (0.00136) (0.00101) (0.00193) 
Woman German citizenship -0.00034 -0.00069 0.00103 
 (0.00147) (0.00109) (0.00208) 
Owner-occupied housing -0.00424*** -0.00316*** 0.00740*** 
 (0.00052) (0.00039) (0.00074) 
Year 2013 (baseline category: year 2008) 0.00194*** 0.00091** -0.00285*** 
 (0.00052) (0.00039) (0.00073) 
2nd quarter (baseline category: 1st quarter) 0.00251*** 0.00042 -0.00293*** 
 (0.00058) (0.00043) (0.00082) 
3rd quarter -0.00005 -0.00068* 0.00072 
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 (0.00054) (0.00041) (0.00077) 
4th quarter 0.00421*** 0.00318*** -0.00739*** 
 (0.00064) (0.00048) (0.00091) 
Constant 0.01532 0.02760 0.95708*** 
 (0.02900) (0.02163) (0.04122) 
    
Dummies for the federal state and level of agglomeration yes yes yes 
    
N 19,322 19,322 19,322 
Sources: EVS data 2008, 2013; own calculations. 
 
 
Table D.2:  
Robustness check: Sample restriction on 𝒔 lying between 0.2 and 0.8 
 




Men's clothing and 
footwear 
Composite good 
    
Price women's clothing and footwear (log) -0.06728*** -0.01747 0.08474*** 
 (0.01934) (0.01389) (0.02714) 
Price men's clothing and footwear (log) 0.02090 -0.00524 -0.01566 
 (0.01959) (0.01410) (0.02750) 
Price composite good (log) 0.04637*** 0.02270** -0.06908*** 
 (0.01296) (0.00927) (0.01826) 
Budget (𝛽) 0.08930*** 0.05029*** -0.13959*** 
 (0.00610) (0.00439) (0.00853) 
Budget squared (𝜆) -0.01036*** -0.00577*** 0.01614*** 
 (0.00093) (0.00067) (0.00130) 
Women's income contribution share (𝛼) 0.00299 -0.01245*** 0.00946** 
 (0.00324) (0.00233) (0.00454) 
𝜐1 - Women's income contribution share 0.00370 0.00668*** -0.01038** 
 (0.00327) (0.00235) (0.00459) 
𝜐2 - Budget -0.01156*** -0.00765*** 0.01920*** 
 (0.00150) (0.00108) (0.00210) 
One child (baseline category: no children) -0.01080*** -0.00802*** 0.01882*** 
 (0.00064) (0.00046) (0.00089) 
Two children -0.01469*** -0.01093*** 0.02562*** 
 (0.00073) (0.00053) (0.00103) 
Three children -0.02025*** -0.01475*** 0.03500*** 
 (0.00156) (0.00112) (0.00219) 
Four or more children -0.02409*** -0.01501*** 0.03910*** 
 (0.00374) (0.00269) (0.00524) 
Married -0.00166*** -0.00081** 0.00247*** 
 (0.00056) (0.00040) (0.00078) 
Woman's age -0.00705*** -0.00084 0.00789** 
 (0.00244) (0.00175) (0.00342) 
Woman's age squared 0.00021*** 0.00003 -0.00024** 
 (0.00008) (0.00006) (0.00011) 
Woman's age cubic -0.00000** -0.00000 0.00000* 
 (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
Woman's age quartic 0.00000** 0.00000 -0.00000* 
 (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
Man's age -0.00617** -0.00495*** 0.01113*** 
 (0.00249) (0.00179) (0.00349) 
Man's age squared 0.00016** 0.00013** -0.00030*** 
 (0.00008) (0.00006) (0.00011) 
Man's age cubic -0.00000* -0.00000** 0.00000** 
 (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
Man's age quartic 0.00000* 0.00000* -0.00000** 
 (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
Man German citizenship 0.00057 0.00091 -0.00149 
 (0.00154) (0.00111) (0.00216) 
Woman German citizenship -0.00254* -0.00172 0.00426** 
 (0.00154) (0.00111) (0.00217) 
Owner-occupied housing -0.00514*** -0.00352*** 0.00866*** 
 (0.00053) (0.00038) (0.00074) 
Year 2013 (baseline category: year 2008) 0.00144*** 0.00077** -0.00221*** 
 (0.00053) (0.00038) (0.00074) 
2nd quarter (baseline category: 1st quarter) 0.00257*** 0.00027 -0.00284*** 
Notes: Adjusted standard errors in parentheses, asymptotic variance-covariance matrix according to Blundell and Robin (1999).       
Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. Homogeneity restriction is imposed. 
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 (0.00059) (0.00043) (0.00083) 
3rd quarter -0.00052 -0.00090** 0.00142* 
 (0.00056) (0.00040) (0.00078) 
4th quarter 0.00454*** 0.00314*** -0.00769*** 
 (0.00065) (0.00047) (0.00091) 
Constant 0.02475 0.00674 0.96851*** 
 (0.02557) (0.01839) (0.03586) 
    
Dummies for the federal state and level of agglomeration yes yes yes 
    
N 19,257 19,257 19,257 
Sources: EVS data 2008, 2013; own calculations. 
Notes: Adjusted standard errors in parentheses, asymptotic variance-covariance matrix according to Blundell and Robin (1999).       
Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. Homogeneity restriction is imposed. 
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